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Abstract 
Theoretically and numerically, we analyze the unemployment and income-distribution effects of 
economic growth, in a model with optimal saving (investment) and a minimum wage for 
unskilled labor.  Within this three-factor model (including skilled labor), an exogenous rise in the 
growth rate increases unemployment if capital and unskilled labor are complements (versus 
substitutes), implying a trade-off between (faster) growth and (lower) unemployment.  We also 
show how the growth rate affects the skill premium and factor shares of national income, 
providing little support for Piketty’s (2014) controversial thesis that capital’s share is higher 
when growth is slower. 
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1. Introduction 
       The specter of a slowdown in economic growth has recently caught the attention of 
economists and policymakers alike.  Possible reasons for such a slowdown are plentiful.  For 
example, Summers (2015) revives the idea of secular stagnation, whereby growth slows because 
of insufficient demand.  On the other hand, Gordon (2012) questions whether productivity-
enhancing innovations can continue on a scale observed in the past, and he identifies a host of 
other issues (such as demographics) that may further decrease the growth rate in the United 
States (and elsewhere).  In any case, the potential ramifications of slower growth are wide-
ranging and important.  For instance, unemployment may rise, as predicted by Okun’s Law, and 
the distribution of income may become severely skewed, as argued by Piketty (2014).   
In light of these concerns, the present paper analyzes how the level of unemployment and 
the distribution of income respond to changes in the rate of economic growth.  To abstract from 
the underlying determinants of this rate, we specify (and change) it exogenously.  Our analysis 
occurs within a one-good model, under perfect competition and constant returns to scale.  This 
model also includes physical capital arising from optimal savings, as well as fixed endowments 
of skilled and unskilled labor.  
       Within our analytic framework, some unskilled labor is unemployed because of a minimum 
real wage for this particular factor of production.  Although minimum wages hold a long-
standing place of prominence in the history of economic thought—dating back at least as far as 
Mill (1848)1— they appear to be scarce in the theoretical literature on optimal growth.  This 
                                                          
1 See his critique “Of Popular Remedies for Low Wages” (the title of his chap. XII on pp. 424-
438 in bk. II of vol. I), as well as Leonard’s (2000) section on the “History of Minimum-Wage 
Legislation and Its Economics”. 
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apparent scarcity might well result from an inherent problem of overdetermination, which is 
explained (and solved) below. 
       Although we assume that the minimum wage arises simply from government legislation, one 
could also interpret it as the result of some other institutional arrangement, such as social custom 
or labor unions.  Alternatively, workers may refuse to accept any job that pays less than some 
type of unemployment benefit (financed by lump-sum taxes), which could thus be viewed as 
analytically equivalent to a minimum wage.  In any case, within our model, the wage for 
unskilled labor is constrained to exceed the level required for full employment.  
There are two main reasons for assuming a third factor in the form of skilled labor, which 
remains fully employed because its wage is perfectly flexible.  First, it is realistic to recognize 
that a minimum wage usually applies to only part of the labor force.  Second, in an optimally 
saving economy with exogenous growth and constant returns to scale, a binding minimum wage 
would overdetermine the steady-state equilibrium if there were only two factors (capital and 
labor).2  Our three-input specification also allows us to consider the implications of factor 
substitutes versus complements (as defined below), and discover an additional determinant of the 
wage differential between the two types of labor. 
       Within our model, an exogenous rise in the rate of growth increases (decreases) the 
unemployment rate when capital and unskilled labor are complements (substitutes), in the sense 
that the marginal product of each of these two inputs depends positively (negatively) on the 
                                                          
2 The growth rate determines the rate of return on capital (via the household’s Euler equation), 
thereby pinning down the wage rate (in the two-factor case), which thus cannot be fixed also by 
the minimum wage.  For alternative (two-factor) solutions to this overdetermination problem, see 
Brecher, Chen and Yu (2013) and Brecher and Gross (2017). 
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quantity of the other input.3  In other words, if and only if capital and unskilled labor are 
complements, there is a trade-off between (faster) growth and (lower) unemployment. 
       Such a growth-unemployment trade-off has been studied previously under alternative 
assumptions about the labor market.  For example, Aghion and Howitt (1994) and Pissarides 
(1990, chap. 2; 2000, chap. 3) use search-and-matching models of frictional unemployment, 
whereas Brecher, Chen and Choudhri (2002) assume that unemployment arises for efficiency-
wage reasons.  The present paper contributes to this literature by analyzing the simpler but 
classic case of unemployment due to a minimum-wage constraint.  This case sheds new light on 
the relationship between growth and unemployment, by featuring the important role of factor 
substitutes/complements.             
       We also address the recent controversy over Piketty’s (2014, especially p. 233) thesis that a 
fall in the rate of growth implies a rise in capital’s share of national income.4  Although our 
minimum-wage analysis does not generally support his thesis, some support is provided under 
certain assumptions about depreciation of capital and elasticities of factor substitution (between 
capital and both types of labor).  
       Section 2 sets up our basic model of optimal growth with a minimum wage.  Using this 
model, section 3 explores the relationship between the rates of growth and unemployment.  
Section 4 analyzes how a change in the growth rate affects the distribution of income among the 
                                                          
3 Although various empirical studies suggest that capital is more complementary with skilled 
than with unskilled labor (as discussed by Violante, 2008), there appears to be no consensus on 
whether capital and unskilled labor are in fact complements rather than substitutes (as defined 
here).  We thus consider both of these alternative possibilities. 
4 For a detailed critique of this book and of some related work, see Rognlie (2015).  See also 
Fischer’s (2017) critique, within an optimal-growth model without a minimum wage. 
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three factors of production.  To estimate the magnitude of our theoretical results, section 5 
numerically simulates the effects of economic growth on unemployment and income distribution.  
Section 6 provides some concluding remarks. 
2. Basic Model 
       The economy produces a single good that can be consumed or added to the capital stock. 
The production function for this good is concave and linearly homogeneous with positive but 
diminishing marginal productivity, as follows: 
          ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )Y F K L S F K l s f k l s     ,  (1) 
where Y denotes aggregate output; K stands for the total stock of capital; l and s represent the 
economy’s inputs of unskilled and skilled labor, respectively, in natural units; λ is the number of 
efficiency units per natural unit of (skilled and unskilled) labor; while /k K  , L l  and 
S s .  Although all variables (above and below) are functions of time, the time argument t is 
suppressed for simplicity of notation, except where needed for clarity.   
       Identical firms maximize profits under perfect competition, thereby satisfying the usual 
marginal-productivity conditions, which are  
          ( , , )kr f k l s , (2) 
          ( , , )lw f k l s , (3) 
           [ ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )] /k lq f k l s kf k l s lf k l s s   , (4) 
where r denotes the real rental rate of capital; w and q represent the real wage rates per efficiency 
unit of unskilled and skilled labor, respectively; subscripts of functions denote partial derivatives 
(e.g., /kf f k    and /kk kf f k   ); and the right-hand side of (4) is equivalent to ( , , )sf k l s  
by Euler’s Theorem.  As explained below, (2) - (4) determine the steady-state values of k, l and 
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q—given w (fixed by the minimum wage), r (determined by the growth rate in the Euler equation 
for dynamic optimization), and s (equalling the perfectly inelastic supply of skilled labor).  
       For simplicity of exposition, skilled and unskilled labor have fixed endowments, equal to s  
and l , respectively.  Since q is perfectly flexible, skilled labor remains fully employed, with 
s s  at all points in time.  However, because w is subject to a binding minimum-wage 
constraint, l is variable, and unskilled labor has a rate 1 /l l  of unemployment.  
       Subject to their budget constraint, identical consumers competitively maximize the present 
discounted value of lifetime utility, in a way consistent with the behavior of a representative 
household.5  In particular, according to the usual specification, this household maximizes 
          1
0
[ / (1 )]dtV e C t  
    ,   (5) 
subject to 
          ( )X r X w l q s C       , (6) 
where ( 1)   is a strictly positive constant6, ρ stands for the constant rate of time preference, C 
                                                          
5 We could relax this one-household assumption—at the cost of complicating the exposition—
without affecting our theoretical results about steady states.  Furthermore, in the numerical 
simulations of section 5, the transitional paths between steady-state equilibria remain virtually 
unchanged for all aggregate variables (such as k and l) when the model is extended to include 
three representative households, each with the same utility function but different factor 
endowments. 
6 Under this formulation, the instantaneous utility function [namely, 
1 / (1 )C    ] has an 
elasticity of marginal utility equal to θ.  Alternatively, this elasticity would equal 1 if 
instantaneous utility were re-specified as lnC, in which case our analysis and results would be 
qualitatively unchanged.  In fact, for this log-utility case, simply replace θ by 1 in all applicable 
equations except (5), (8) and (10). 
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represents total consumption, X denotes aggregate wealth,   ( 0)  is capital’s constant rate of 
depreciation (and hence r   equals the rate of interest on assets), while an overdot indicates a 
time derivative (e.g., /X dX dt ). 
       The value of λ at time t is  
          ( ) (0)egtt  ,                                                                                                                    (7) 
where g (≥ 0) is the constant rate of labor-augmenting technical progress.  With this equation, as                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
well as the definitions that /x X   and /c C  , the household’s optimization problem can be 
restated as maximizing 
          1 [ (1 ) ] 1
0
(0) [ / (1 )]dg tV e c t    
      , (8) 
subject to 
          ( )x r g x wl qs c      ,                                                                                            (9) 
where (1 )g    is now the household’s effective discount rate, assumed to be greater than 
zero for well-known reasons (as discussed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin ,1995, pp. 73-74).  
       The current-value Hamiltonian for this maximization problem is 
          
1 / (1 ) [( ) ]H c r g x wl qs c           , (10) 
where (0) 1   by normalization (without loss of generality); and   is a co-state variable that 
can be interpreted as the shadow price of assets (x).  The necessary conditions for a maximum 
include                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
          / 0H c c       , (11) 
          [ (1 ) ] / ( )g H x g r                , (12) 
in addition to the wealth-accumulation constraint (9), as well as the usual initial and 
transversality conditions. 
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      Note that f wl rk qs    because perfectly competitive firms make zero profits under 
constant returns to scale, and that x k  since household wealth equals the stock of capital.  
Thus, (11) allows us to rewrite (9) as 
          1/( , , ) ( )k f k l s g k      .    (13) 
       The next two sections derive some key properties of the steady-state equilibrium, at which
0k   .  This equilibrium is saddle-path stable, as appendix A shows by examining the 
dynamic system corresponding to (12) and (13).  
3. Unemployment and Growth 
       This section derives a necessary and sufficient condition for a trade-off between 
unemployment and growth.  In deriving this condition, we compare the steady-state equilibrium 
levels of unemployment for two different rates of exogenous growth.   
       In steady state (where 0  ), the Euler equation (12) can be written as 
          r g     . (14) 
Substitute this equation into (2); and in (3), replace w by w , which is a constant representing the 
binding minimum wage (per efficiency unit of unskilled labor).7  Then, differentiate the resulting 
two equations totally with respect to g, after setting s s , and solve simultaneously for 
          / /lldk dg f  ,                (15) 
          / /lkdl dg f   , (16) 
where ll kk lk klf f f f   .    
                                                          
7 The minimum wage per natural unit of unskilled labor is thus w , which grows at the rate g, as 
required for balanced growth. 
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       To ensure that these expressions for /dk dg  and /dl dg  exist, so that k and l are (singled-
valued) functions of g, assume that   is non-zero.  Note also that   is non-negative, because it 
is a second-order principal minor of the Hessian matrix of a concave function (f).   Therefore, 
0  .8  We also have 0llf  , by diminishing marginal productivity.  Thus, / 0dk dg   
unambiguously in (15), while / 0dl dg



 as 0lkf



  in (16).9  
       In other words, we have the following result. 
Proposition 1.  There is a trade-off between growth and unemployment if and only if capital and 
unskilled labor are complements. 
       To understand this result intuitively, first note that the rise in g leads to an increase in r, in 
accordance with (14).  As usual, such an increase corresponds to a fall in k, given diminishing 
marginal productivity.  This fall is accompanied by a reduction (expansion) in l if capital and 
unskilled labor are complements (substitutes).  The possibility of substitutes is due to the 
presence of the third factor (skilled labor).  Without this factor, the two remaining inputs would 
necessarily be complements, since the marginal product of capital (unskilled labor) then would 
depend negatively (positively) on /k l . 
                                                          
8 This condition is satisfied in, for example, the case of a CES production function.  
Alternatively, 0   if the function ( , , )f k l s  is homogeneous in k and l, in light of Lancaster 
(1968, sect. 8.5, pp. 131-133).  A special case of this second example is the Cobb-Douglas 
production function. 
9 By an analogous derivation, for an exogenous increase in w  at constant g, / 0dl dw (and
/ 0dk dw



 as 0klf



).  See, however, Brecher and Gross (2017) for a two-good two-factor 
endogenous-growth model in which a minimum-wage hike might paradoxically increase total 
employment under perfect competition.    
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4. Income Distribution and Growth 
       The present section analyzes the steady-state relationship between the rate of growth and the 
distribution of income.  To measure this distribution, we initially examine factor shares of gross 
national income (including depreciation).  Then, the discussion turns to shares of net income 
(excluding depreciation).  Neither of these cases provides general support for Piketty’s (2014) 
thesis about capital’s share. 
       Before proceeding with this analysis, we need to determine how a change in g affects q.  For 
this purpose, substitute (2) and (3) into (4) to eliminate kf  and lf , while replacing w and s by w  
and s .  Then differentiate the resulting equation totally with respect to g, using (14).  Next, 
simplify terms by reusing (2) and (3), to verify that 
            / /dq dg k s  .                                                                                                       (17) 
Thus, q and g are inversely related.  Intuitively, since a rise in g increases r (while leaving w 
fixed at w ), q must decrease to prevent profits from falling below zero. 
       Incidentally, it is interesting to note that (17) implies an inverse relationship between the 
growth rate and the widely-discussed “skill premium”, represented here by /q w . This 
relationship suggests another possible determinant of the relative wages of skilled and  
unskilled labor, thereby providing a contribution to the literature [reviewed by Autor (2014)] on 
the skill premium and its various causes.  Contrary to what might be expected from some of this 
literature, a rise in the skilled-labor supply (s) within our model would not affect /q w  in the 
long run (but would simply raise k and l in the same proportion), since the marginal products of 
all three factors are homogeneous of degree 0 (in k, l and s). 
4.1. Gross Shares        
       Define / ( ) 1/ (1 / / )k rk rk wl qs wl rk qs rk       , which is capital’s  
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proportional share of gross national income (before subtracting depreciation).  Thus,  
          2/ [( 1) ( / ) / ( 1) ( / ) / ] /k kl ks kd dg ld w r dg sd q r dg k       ,       (18) 
where [( / ) / ( / )] ( / ) / ( / )kl w r k l d k l d w r   and [( / ) / ( / )] ( / ) / ( / )ks q r k s d k s d q r  , which 
are the total elasticities of  /k l  and /k s  with respect to /w r  and /q r , respectively.  Because 
these input-ratio elasticities let every variable—including output—change with g, they can differ 
from the standard elasticity of technical substitution along a given isoquant.   
       In examining the right-hand side of (18), note that ( / ) /d w r dg < 0 by (14), and that 
( / ) /d q r dg < 0 in accordance with (14) and (17).  Thus, / ( )0kd dg    if kl  and ks are both 
greater (less) than 1.10  This condition would be satisfied in (for example) the case of a regular 
CES production function, whose (constant) elasticity of technical substitution is equal to both 
kl  and ks .
11  On the other hand, / 0kd dg   with a Cobb-Douglas production function, 
characterized by 1kl ks   .  Moreover, if 1kl   and 1ks   have opposite signs, then 
/kd dg is ambiguous in sign.        
       Similarly, 
          2/ [( 1) ( / ) / ( 1) ( / ) / ] /l lk ls ld dg kd r w dg sd q w dg l       , (19) 
          2/ [( 1) ( / ) / ( 1) ( / ) / ] /s sk sl sd dg kd r q dg ld w q dg s       , (20) 
                                                          
10 This result generalizes a well-known property of the standard two-factor one-good model, in 
which a rise in the wage/rental ratio increases (decreases) capital’s share if the elasticity of 
technical substitution is greater (less) than 1.  In the present three-factor model, we must consider 
two separate elasticities, each between capital and a different type of labor. 
11 From now on, we use the terms “regular CES” and “nested CES” to distinguish between the 
conventional type of CES production function and the two-level type introduced by Sato (1967). 
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where l  and s are the proportional national-income shares of unskilled and skilled labor, 
respectively, while ls  ( sl )  is analogous to kl  ( lk ) and ks  ( sk ) .  As these two 
equations show, /ld dg  and /sd dg  are generally ambiguous in sign, although the latter 
derivative is positive (negative) if both sk  and sl  are greater (less) than 1.             
       Nevertheless, the following two points can be made if the production function is of the 
regular CES type, in which case our input-ratio elasticities are all the same (and equal to the 
constant elasticity of technical substitution).  First, when (17) is substituted into (19), simple 
rearrangement of terms shows that / 0ld dg  .  Second, because unskilled labor’s share thus 
remains unchanged while the three factor shares sum identically to 1, / /s kd dg d dg   .
12   
       Thus, we can now state the following result. 
Proposition 2.  With regular CES technology, a rise in the growth rate increases (decreases) 
capital’s proportional share of gross national income if the elasticity of technical substitution is 
less (greater) than 1, has the exact opposite effect on skilled labor’s share, and has no effect on 
the share of unskilled labor. 
       This constancy of unskilled labor’s share does not necessarily survive a relaxation of the 
regular CES specification, which requires every pair of factors to be complements.  For example, 
suppose instead that capital and labor are substitutes (in the sense that 0lkf  ).  Then, a rise in g 
increases /l s  (by Proposition 1) while raising /w q  [by (17)], thereby implying that 0ls  .  
By similar reasoning, 0lk   [(in light of (15) and (16)].  Given the signs of these two 
                                                          
12 The fact that /kd dg  and /sd dg  have opposite signs is easily reconfirmed, by comparing 
(20) with (18), while noting that / 0 /dr dg dq dg   from (14) and (17). 
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elasticities, and using (17), we can easily verify that the right-hand side of (19) is strictly 
positive.          
       Other common measures of income distribution are the relative (versus proportional) income 
shares, represented by / ( / )k l rk wl   , /k s   and /s l  .  If there were only two factors, 
each one’s relative and proportional shares would clearly have to change in the same direction.  
However, in the present three-input model, the two types of shares for each factor can instead 
change in opposite directions.       
       Proposition 2 immediately implies the following result about relative shares. 
Proposition 3.  In the case of regular CES technology with an elasticity of technical 
substitution that is less (greater) than 1, a rise in the growth rate increases (decreases) capital’s 
gross income relative to each type of labor’s income, while lowering (raising) skilled relative to 
unskilled labor’s income. 
       When the regular-CES restriction is relaxed, there are a few additional results about the 
relationship between the growth rate and relative income shares.  First, if we assume that capital 
and labor are substitutes (in the sense that 0lkf  ), then (16) and (17) imply that 
( / ) / 0s ld dg   .  Under the additional assumption that the production function has the nested 
CES form, it is straightforward (but tedious) to show that ( / ) / 0k ld dg    as well. 
Alternatively, if 0lsf  , then ( / ) / 0k ld dg    by a simple proof.
13  
 
                                                          
13 Differentiate /wl rk  with respect to g, use (14) – (16), and note that ll lk lslf kf sf    (as 
implied by Euler’s Theorem).  Incidentally, this identity confirms that if 0lsf  , then 0lkf     
(because 0llf  ). 
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4.2. Net Shares 
       Since depreciation is substantial in relation to total output, capital’s share of gross income 
significantly overstates this factor’s potential contribution to consumption or investment.  For 
this reason, shares of net income (excluding depreciation) are arguably at least as important as 
gross shares.  Moreover, in examining the share of capital, Piketty (2014) focuses on the net 
(rather than gross) version of this share.  
       Thus, define ( ) / [( ) ]k r k r k wl qs       , which is capital’s proportional share of net 
national income.  Using this definition and the above one for capital’s gross share, 
straightforward manipulation shows that 
          1/ [1 (1/ 1) / (1 / )]k k r      .  (21) 
Similarly, the net shares of unskilled and skilled labor can be expressed as follows: 
          1/ (1/ / )l l k wl    ,  (22) 
          1/{1 [ (1 / ) ] / }s k l sr        . (23) 
       Using (21) – (23) and Proposition 2, while noting that ( / ) / 0d k l dg   if skilled and 
unskilled labor are complements14, we immediately obtain the following result. 
Proposition 4.  If the elasticity of technical substitution is less (greater) than 1 in the case of 
regular CES technology, an increase in the growth rate has a positive (ambiguous) effect on 
capital’s proportional share of net national income, and negative (ambiguous) effects on the net 
shares of both skilled and unskilled labor.   
       Since / ( / ) /s l s lqs wl     , Propositions 3 and 4 immediately imply the following 
result.  
                                                          
14 From (15), (16) and the identity in footnote 13, 2( / ) / / 0
ls
d k l dg sf l    . 
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Proposition 5.  For regular CES technology with an elasticity of technical substitution that is 
less (greater) than 1, an increase in the growth rate has a positive (ambiguous) effect on 
capital’s net income relative to each type of labor’s income, while lowering (raising) skilled 
relative to unskilled labor’s income. 
5. Numerical Analysis 
       This section conducts numerical simulations to provide rough estimates of the (above- 
derived) effects of economic growth on unemployment and income distribution.  For this 
purpose, we use a discrete-time version of our model as outlined in Appendix B.  In the 
experiment conducted, the economy starts on a path of balanced growth, and then the 
(exogenous) rate of (labor-augmenting) technical change falls permanently in period 51.  Here 
we consider a growth-rate decrease (as opposed to the increase discussed in our theoretical 
sections), since the public/academic debate currently appears to focus on a slowdown in growth 
(as noted in the introduction).   
5.1. Calibration 
       Following Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), we set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution  
equal to 0.5 (implying that our 2  ), the depreciation rate ( ) to 0.07, the initial rate of growth  
to 2%, and each time period to one year.  As for our new growth rate, it is arbitrarily specified as 
1%.  We also set the endowment of unskilled labor ( l ) equal to 1 by choice of units, while 
assuming that the relative supply of skilled labor ( / /1s l s ) is 1.14, which corresponds to the 
ratio of labor-force participants with a bachelor’s degree or higher to those with high-school or 
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less education in the United States population aged 25-64.15  
      Our production function is 1/( , , ) [ (1 ) ]f k l s az a s     , where 1/[ (1 ) ]z bk b l     .  The 
variable z can be interpreted as the quantity of a composite input, produced by capital and 
unskilled labor, for use with skilled labor; while a, b,   and    are parameters.  With this 
formulation, we consider two distinct scenarios.  The first one assumes that   , which 
corresponds to a regular CES function (characterized by 0lkf  ). The second scenario adopts a 
nested CES function with 0lkf  , implying that   .  
       In the regular CES case, we set the elasticity of technical substitution at 0.67, corresponding 
to 1 1/ 0.67    .  For the nested CES case:   1 1/1.67   , which implies that the elasticity 
of substitution between capital and unskilled labor is 1.67, in accordance with Krusell, Ohanian, 
Ríos-Rull and Violante (2000)16; while 1 1/ 0.67    as before, yielding 0.67 as the substitution 
elasticity for skilled labor and the composite input (of capital and unskilled labor).    
       In each case, we calibrate the parameters a, b and ?̅? to achieve the following outcomes on 
the initial balanced-growth path: capital’s proportional share of gross national income is 0.35, the 
skill premium is 1.94, and the unemployment rate (1 / 1 /1l l l   ) for unskilled labor is 10%.17  
                                                          
15 This calculation uses seasonally adjusted data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for January 
2016.  Excluded are workers with less education than a bachelor’s degree but more than high 
school, since the Bureau does not provide earnings data (see below) for this category. 
16 They use a different specification of the nested CES function, where capital and skilled (rather 
than unskilled) labor form the composite input. Their specification, however, does not allow for 
the present possibility of 0lkf  .  Unlike them, moreover, we do not distinguish between capital 
equipment and structures. 
17 More specifically: in the regular CES case, a = 0.6873, b = 0.8355 and w  = 0.52; while the 
nested CES case has a = 0.6228, b = 0.4922 and w  = 0.3573. 
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Although our unemployment rate may seem to be on the high side—according to the (U.S.) 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, the average rate in January 2016 for people with a high-school degree 
or less was only 5.7%— the low participation rate of this group (55.4%) presumably masks a 
higher effective rate of unemployment.  Moreover, if the unemployment rate were initially 5.7% 
in the regular CES case, the minimum wage would cease to bind along the new balanced-growth 
path and unemployment would completely disappear, thereby drastically strengthening the 
growth-unemployment trade-off reported below.  The skill premium corresponds to the ratio of 
median weekly earnings of people with a bachelor’s degree or more education to those with a 
high-school degree or less, in the data set indicated above.  The specified value of capital’s share 
is standard in the literature.  We also choose the household’s time-discount factor (   from 
Appendix B) so that the annual interest rate net of depreciation and growth ( r g  ) along the 
initial balanced-growth path is 4%.18 
5.2. Trade-off between Unemployment and Growth 
       For the case in which capital and unskilled labor are complements, our estimates show a 
clear trade-off between unemployment and growth, consistent with Proposition 1.  As Figure 1 
illustrates for regular CES technology (and hence for 0lkf  ), a drop in the growth rate (from 
2% to 1% after 𝑡 = 50) causes the steady-state rate of unemployment (1 l  given 1l  )  to 
decrease dramatically (from 10% to 2.2%). 
 
                                                          
18 This choice ensures that 1  , which is usually assumed in the literature with infinitely-lived 
dynasties.  In the discussion of robustness (below), we also consider the case where  0.04r  
and 1  , as assumed by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011).  Under these alternative assumptions, our 
results are even stronger. 
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Figure 1: Unemployment Over Time with Regular CES Technology 
 
              Notably, despite this strong labor-market improvement, the slowdown in growth reduces 
lifetime utility (V) of the representative household. This result continues to hold for a wide range 
of reasonable (and even unreasonable) parameter choices.  At the same time, moreover, the skill 
premium ( /q w ) rises substantially (by 13.3%). 
       When capital and unskilled labor are instead substitutes (with 0lkf  ), a drop in the growth 
rate then increases unemployment. In our parametrization of the nested CES case, the 
unemployment increase is relatively small (from 10% to 12.6%).  It is thus unsurprising that a 
slowdown in growth again reduces the lifetime value of household utility. The corresponding rise 
(13.7%) in the skill premium is comparable to the rise in the previous (regular-CES) case.   
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5.3. Evolution of Factor Shares 
       In accordance with the theoretical analysis (above) and as illustrated by Figure 2 for the 
regular CES case, the proportional share of unskilled labor in gross income remains constant (at 
19%), while skilled labor’s share increases (from 46% to 48%) and capital’s decreases (from 
35% to 33%). The movement in proportional shares of net income is more pronounced in Figure  
3, where the share of capital still drops (now from 20% to 15%), while unskilled labor’s share 
rises modestly (from 23% to 24%) and skilled labor’s again increases (from 57% to 61%).19 
 
      Figure 2: Proportional Shares of Gross Income Over Time with Regular CES Technology 
                                                          
19 Capital’s gross (net) income relative to the income of unskilled labor drops from 1.86 to 1.76 
(0.86 to 0.63), the corresponding drop for capital relative to skilled labor is from 0.76 to 0.69 
(0.35 to 0.25), and skilled relative to unskilled labor’s income rises from 2.46 to 2.56. 
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 Figure 3: Proportional Shares of Net Income Over Time with Regular CES Technology 
        
       Whereas these numerical results accord with our Propositions 2 and 4, they contradict 
Piketty’s (2014) thesis that a fall in the growth rate will raise the share of capital. The driving 
force for this contradiction is our (conventional) adoption of a less-than-unitary elasticity of 
technical substitution.  Larger values of this elasticity, however, are considered in the robustness 
exercises below. 
       For the nested CES case illustrated in Figure 4, capital’s proportional share of gross income 
remains almost unchanged (at approximately 35%), while unskilled labor’s share declines (from 
19% to 17%) and skilled labor’s grows (from 46% to 48%). In terms of net income shares, 
Figure 5 shows a substantial reduction for capital (from 20% to 16%), along with a decrease for 
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unskilled labor (23% to 22%) and an increase for skilled labor (57% to 62%).20  Thus, once again 
contrary to Piketty’s (2014) thesis, the share of capital fails to rise in response to slower growth. 
 
 
Figure 4: Proportional Shares of Gross Income Over Time with Nested CES Technology 
                                                          
20 Capital’s gross (net) income relative to the income of unskilled labor now drops from 1.86 to 
2.09 (0.86 to 0.75), the corresponding drop for capital relative to skilled labor is from 0.76 to 
0.73 (0.35 to 0.26), while skilled relative to unskilled labor’s income rises from 2.46 to 2.88. 
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Figure 5: Proportional Shares of Net Income Over Time with Nested CES Technology 
5.4. Robustness 
       This section investigates the robustness of our numerical results in three different ways.  
First, we consider the implications of changes in two key elasticities  that the literature does not 
tightly pin down.  In each case, when an elasticity is changed, other parameters are recalibrated 
to achieve the same targeted outcomes (e.g., initial values of the unemployment rate and skill 
premium) specified above.  Second, we examine the consequences of an alternative assumption 
about the rate of interest.  The third exercise is to explore the effects of relaxing the one-
household assumption.  Taken together, these three exercises confirm the robustness of our 
simulations. 
       Perhaps the most important finding relates to the elasticity of technical substitution in the 
case of regular CES technology.  More specifically, unless this elasticity is almost 2 or greater, a 
drop in the growth rate still lowers capital’s proportional net-income share (the type of capital 
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share examined by Picketty, 2014).  This threshold value, moreover, lies well above widely cited 
estimates.21   
       When we increase or decrease the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), all responses 
to a change in the growth rate are respectively muted or magnified, because of how the IES 
( 1/ )  enters the Euler equation [(14) above or (B9) in appendix B].  In this regard, note that 
our baseline value of 0.5 for the IES is larger than Havranek’s (2015) point estimate of 0.33, but 
is still well within the range that he finds to be empirically relevant. 
       If we follow Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) in setting 0.04r    (implying 1.0004  ), the 
unemployment rate’s response to a change in the growth rate becomes even more pronounced, 
especially in the nested CES case.  In either CES case (nested or regular), a decrease in the 
growth rate then leads to a greater decline in capital’s proportional share of (gross and net) 
income, and to a larger rise in the skill premium.  
       To relax the single-household assumption, imagine instead that there are three (optimally 
saving) households. Suppose that one of these representative agents earns income from capital 
only, another has the entire endowment of unskilled labor, and the third supplies all of the skilled 
labor.  As long as all three households have the same utility function (and hence the same Euler 
equation), the steady-state relationships between the growth rate and national aggregates (such as 
k and l) remain the same as before.  Even the transitional paths of these aggregates are virtually 
unchanged in our numerical simulations.  Furthermore, in response to a decrease in the growth 
rate, the time paths of income shares for the three households (capital-only, unskilled and skilled) 
                                                          
21 Most of these estimates are less than 1 in the empirical literature surveyed by Chirinko (2008).  
However, some doubts about the validity of this consensus are raised by Palivos (2008) as well 
as Piketty and Zucman (2015, section 15.5.3).   
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are qualitatively the same as—but less pronounced than—the above-illustrated paths for the three 
factors (capital, unskilled labor, and skilled labor, respectively).22  This growth-rate reduction 
also lowers lifetime utility of every household—regardless of what happens to factor incomes— 
for the broad range of parameter values considered.    
6. Conclusion  
       Motivated by the specter of a slowdown in economic growth, this paper analyzes the effects 
that the growth rate has on unemployment and income distribution.  Our model assumes optimal 
saving and investment, as well as a minimum wage applied only to unskilled (versus skilled) 
labor.   
       Within this three-factor model, an exogenous rise in the growth rate leads to an increase or 
decrease in unemployment if capital and unskilled labor are respectively complements or 
substitutes, while skilled (flexible-wage) labor remains fully employed.  Thus, complementarity 
of this type is a necessary and sufficient condition for a trade-off between growth and 
unemployment.   
       In the special case of regular CES technology with an elasticity of substitution that is less 
(greater) than 1, the rise in the growth rate also causes an increase (decrease) in capital’s 
proportional share of gross national income and has the opposite effect on the share of skilled 
labor, while unskilled labor’s share remains unchanged.  Qualitatively similar results hold for 
shares in net income when the substitution elasticity is less than 1, except that unskilled labor’s 
share now falls in response to faster growth.  Thus, except under special assumptions about 
                                                          
22 This result holds under a wide range of assumptions about the initial distribution of wealth.  In 
our baseline specification, the capital-only, unskilled and skilled households respectively own 
50%, 10% and 40% of the initial wealth. 
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technology, the present analysis does not provide support for Piketty’s (2014) thesis, which 
predicts an inverse relationship between the growth rate and capital’s share. 
       To estimate the unemployment and income-distribution responses to a decrease in the rate of 
economic growth, we undertake numerical simulations, using a discrete-time version of our main 
(continuous-time) model.  As these simulations suggest, the effects of growth can be substantial, 
for a wide range of parameter values.   
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Appendix A: Saddle-Path Stability 
       We now show that the steady-state equilibrium is saddle-path stable.  For this purpose, 
consider Figure A, which is the phase diagram for the dynamic system described by (12) and 
(13). 
 
Figure A: Phase Diagram 
       By the following argument, the schedule for 0   is a horizontal line, at a height 
determined by the unique value of k in steady-state equilibrium.  Dividing (16) by (15) yields 
          / /lk lldl dk f f  .           (A1) 
Similarly, using (15) while noting that /dr dg  from (14), obtain 
          / / 0lldr dk f   , (A2) 
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where the inequality follows from the above assumptions that 0 llf   .  Thus, there is only 
one value of k that satisfies steady-state condition (14) for a given g. 
       Starting from any point on the schedule for 0  , a rise (fall) in k would lower (raise) r by 
(A2), and hence lead to ( )0    by (12).  Thus, at all points above (below) this line, the 
horizontal arrows of motion for   point to the right (left). 
       Setting 0k   while holding g and s (= s ) fixed, differentiate (13) totally with respect to k. 
Then use (A1) and (2) to show that 
          1 1// [( / ) ]l lk lld dk f f f g r
       .        (A3) 
To sign this expression, suppose initially that 0lkf  .  Also note that r > g in steady-state 
equilibrium, to satisfy the transversality condition, as explained by Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995, p. 71).  Then, at this equilibrium point E, the right-hand side of (A3) is negative, in which 
case the (generally non-linear) curve for 0k   is negatively sloped.  Although this curve could 
be positively sloped outside the neighborhood of point E, our analysis below would be 
qualitatively unaffected by this possibility. 
       In accordance with (13), / 0k    .  Thus, at any point to the right or left of the schedule 
for 0k  , the vertical arrows of motion for k  point upward or downward, respectively. 
       The saddle path is the dashed (and generally non-linear) curve.  At time 0,   jumps 
instantaneously to reach this curve. The economy then moves continuously along the saddle path 
toward the steady-state equilibrium, located at the point (E) where the three curves intersect. 
       Alternatively, if 0lkf  , the right-hand side of (A3) might be positive at the steady-state 
equilibrium, in which case the schedule for 0k   would slope upwards at point E.  Nevertheless, 
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this equilibrium would still be saddle-path stable, as could be readily verified by the same 
reasoning used above.   
Appendix B: Discrete-Time Model 
       The household maximizes 
          
1
0
0
/ (1 )t
t
t
V C  


  , (B1) 
 subject to 
          
1 ( )t t t t t t t ttX X r X w l q s C         , (B2) 
where  , a non-negative constant, is the subjective discount factor between any two contiguous 
periods; and all other symbols are as defined in the continuous-time model above, except that a 
time subscript is now used to denote a variable’s value in period t (or t + 1).  Since /t t tc C   , 
/t t tx X    and 1 (1 ) tt g     now that g is the growth rate per period, the household’s 
optimization problem can be restated as maximizing 
          1 1 1
0 0
0
[ (1 ) ] / (1 )t t
t
V g c    

  

   , (B3) 
subject to  
          
1 [( ) ] / (1 )t t t t t ttx x r g x wl q s c g         , (B4) 
where the effective discount factor is now 
1(1 ) 1g    , in accordance with Stokey, Lucas and 
Presott (1989, section 5.4).  
       The Lagrangian for this maximization problem can be written as                 
          1 1
1
0
[ (1 ) ] / (1 ) [(1 ) (1 ) ]t t t t t t t t t
t
g c m r x wl q s c g x   

 


           , (B5) 
where tm  is a Lagrange multiplier, and 0 1   without loss of generality.  The first-order 
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conditions for a maximum include / 0tc    and 1/ 0tx    , which respectively imply the 
following two equations for all 0t  : 
          1[ (1 ) ]tt tm g c
    , (B6) 
          1 1(1 ) (1 )t t tm g m r      . (B7) 
Combining these two equations, we obtain 
          1 1(1 ) (1 )t t tc g c r
          , (B8) 
which is the familiar condition for intertemporal optimality. 
       In steady-state equilibrium (with 1t tc c  , 1t tr r  , etc.), (B8) and the usual marginal-
productivity conditions imply  
          1(1 ) 1r g       ,                                                                                                   (B9) 
          ( , , )kr f k l s
   , (B10) 
          ( , , )lw f k l s
  , (B11) 
where asterisks indicate the (unchanging) values of variables in such an equilibrium.  These three 
equations allow us to compute r , k

 and l

.  Then, ( , , )sq f k l s
   ; and 
( )c r g k wl q s          from (B4), since x k  .    Thus, for a given rate of growth, the 
steady-state equilibrium is independent of the initial stock of wealth (capital). 
       When we change the growth rate, the initial capital stock (
0k ) is given, and the transition 
path to the new steady state is determined (for 0t  ) by the following three equations in three 
unknowns ( tc , tl  and 1tk  ): 
          ( , , )l t tw f k l s , (B12) 
           
1[1 ( , , ) ] ( , , ) (1 )t t t t s t t t tkf k l s k wl f k l s s c g k         (B13)        
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          1 1 1(1 ) [1 ( , , ) ]t t k t tc g c f k l s
           . (B14) 
Note that (B13) and (B14) are simply restatements of (B4) and (B5), respectively, after we use 
marginal-productivity conditions (for capital and skilled labor) and the fact that capital is wealth. 
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